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'ABSTRACT 
The Pre f e rent ia l Trade Area (PTA) of Eastern and Southern 
Afr ican States i s a r e l a t i v e l y new economic grouping of states 
that i s designed t o f o s t e r subregional cooperation and integration. 
This paper d iscusses the strategy that l i es behind the establishment 
o f the PTA, provides an overview of subregional trade and obstacles 
to trade be fo re the formation of the PTA, describes the progress of 
the PTA since i t became operational in July, 1984, and assesses that 
progress and the problems that have been encountered. While there 
are many aspects o f the PTA, including industrial and agricultural 
cooperat ion , t h i s paper focuses primarily on subregional trade and 
t rade - re la ted i ssues . 
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INTRODUCTION 
With academic a t tent ion current ly f i x e d on A f r i c a ' s i n t e r -
national debt c r i s i s , IMF c o n d i t i o n a l i t i e s , and the World Bank s t ruc tura l 
adjustment programs that have been ins t i tu ted in half the s ta tes of 
Africa, very l i t t l e analysis i s being done today o f A f r i c a ' s domest i ca l l y -
designed strategy for development. In 1980, the same year that the World 
Bank introduced the concept o f s t ruc tura l adjustment laoans , the African 
states adopted the Lagos Plan o f Act ion , which i s designed t o f o s t e r s e l f -
reliant and self-sustaining development through reg iona l cooperation and 
integration. The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) f o r Eastern and Southern 
African States is one of the subregional economic groupings establ i shed 
within that framework. As such, i t i s expected to so coordinate and 
harmonize i ts development s t r a t e g i e s , p lans , and p o l i c i e s , both within the 
subregion and with other subregions, that i t w i l l become part o f a continent 
wide African common market by the end o f t h i s century. 
The PTA became operat ional in July , 1984, and has made c o n s i d e r -
able progress in some areas toward i t s ultimate g o a l s . This working paper 
is intended to provide ( 1 ) a d i s cuss ion o f the s trategy that l i e s behind 
the establishment of the PTA, (2 ) an overview o f subregional trade and 
obstacles to trade before the formation o f the PTA, (3 ) a d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
PTA operations since i t s incept ion three years ago, and ( 4 ) an assessment 
of progress made and problems encountered. Because the major emphasis o f 
the PTA in its f i r s t stage i s the promotion o f i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade 
(although, as will be seen, there are many other aspects o f the PTA), the 
major focus of this paper in i t s l a t e r se c t i ons i s on subregional trade and 
trade-related issues. 
The 'Strategy behind the ; PTA 
'The African Perspect ive 
In 1985 the Governor o f the Central Bank o f Kenya a t t r ibuted 
Africa 's economic c r i s i s t o "a wide range o f in terna l weaknesses, a h o s t i l e 
external economic environment, and, in recent years , c l i m a t i c factors."" ' " 
Since 1980, 25 African s t a tes have begun t o address t h e i r internal weak-
nesses by instituting p o l i c i e s aimed at s t r u c t u r a l changes in t h e i r economies. 
Similarly, the issue o f increasing food product ion has been given top 
priority as a result o f the severe drought that h i t many Afr ican s tates in 
the early 1980s. External economic f a c t o r s , however, are genera l ly per -
ceived to be more i n t r a c t a b l e , as the Afr i can s tates c o l l e c t i v e l y have not 
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yet mobi l ized s u f f i c i e n t leverage to change the rules of the game. 
From the Afr ican perspective, and that of the Third World 
genera l ly , the most ser ious constraint on development is the structure 
and organizat ion o f the international economic system. In this view, ex-
terna l f a c t o r s over which African states have l i t t l e or no control, such 
as unpredictable f l u c t u a t i o n s in commodity prices, deteriorating terms of 
t rade , r i s i n g protect ionism in the North, decreasing foreign investment in 
A f r i c a , and dec l in ing l e v e l s and more stringent conditionalities of aid, 
have combined t o produce, and w i l l continue to reproduce, many of the 
negative trends in A f r i c a ' s economic development. 
The depth o f A f r i c a ' s economic cr is is is reflected in part in 
the debt problems o f the Afr ican states. In 1983 Africa 's level of debt 
se rv i ce reached 59 percent o f exports. For the f i r s t time in i ts history, 
more c a p i t a l f lowed out o f A fr i ca than came in, as principal and interest 
repayments exceeded the c o n t i n e n t ' s combined export earnings, foreign 
d i r e c t investment, and f o re ign a id . (Kenya faced this problem for the 
f i r s t time in 1986). At the same time, an increasing number of African 
countr ies found i t necessary to institute austerity programs prescribed by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to secure desparately needed 
in fus ions o f hard currency. Ten African states, double the number in the 
2 previous year , were f o r ced t o reschedule their external debts in 1983, 
3 
ten more in 1984, another ten in 1985. Partly as a result of austerity 
4 
measures i n s t i t u t e d m many o f these states, the combined de f i c i t of the 
African s tates f e l l by the end o f 1985,5 although their debt-export ratios 
remained alarmingly high. Nevertheless, despite this short-term trend 
toward s t a b i l i z a t i o n o f the debt c r i s i s , the IMF and World Bank's most 
o p t i m i s t i c scenarios f o r economic development are unfavorable. Indeed, 
the World Bank's most recent high-case prediction for Africa 's per capita g 
growth rate i s only 0 .8 percent . Therefore, many po l i t i ca l leaders and 
development economists continue t o insist that changes must be made in the 
structure and organizat ion o f the international economic system, in which, 
they contend, s t ructura l adjustments currently must be borne by i t s weakest 
members. 
Early A t t e s t s 't5'Chartge "the'system 
For more than two decades African leaders have joined their 
Third World counterparts in attempts to change the international economic 
system, p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard t o trade. In the mid-1960s, when i t 
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became apparent that the goals o f the F i r s t UN Development Decade would 
not be realized, the developing countr ies began to search f o r a new 
approach to development that would transform t h e i r r e l a t i o n s of economic 
dependence into relat ions o f interdependence with the developed states. 
They gradually evolved a strategy that embraced two concepts : col lect ive 
action and col lect ive s e l f - r e l i a n c e . 
Collective act ion c o n s i s t s o f ( 1 ) formulating a united posi-
tion from which to negot iate with the developed s t a t e s , and (2) trans-
lating that posit ion, using t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e economic power, into 
po l i t i ca l pressure f o r s t r u c t u r a l change in the internat ional economic 
7 
system. From a re la t ive ly inauspic ious beginning at the f i r s t meeting 
of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1954, at 
which a Third World caucus group, the Group of 77, was formed, i t 
became standard procedure f o r the developing s ta tes t o work out a 
common Third World pos i t i on p r i o r t o nego t ia t i ons with the developed 
states in international f o ra . This strategy produced i t s greatest 
achievement at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly 
in 1974— following OPEC s success in ra i s ing o i l p r i c e s - - a t which 
the developing countries pushed through reso lu t i ons c a l l i n g for a New Q International Economic Order. 
The strategy of c o l l e c t i v e act ion had an inherent weakness, 
however, It proved d i f f i c u l t f o r a large group of s ta tes characterized 
by great diversity and important c leavages—the Group of 77 now has 
well over 100 members—to maintain a u n i f i e d bargaining posit ion. This 
became immediately apparent at the next UN Special Sess ion , at which 
a compromise resolution was adopted, c a l l i n g f o r the strengthening of 
9 
the existing international economic system. This outcome was produced 
because a number of moderate s t a t e s within the Group of 77 prevailed 
in the view that obtaining concrete act ion in those areas in which such 
action seemed possible was a b e t t e r p o l i c y than continued confrontation. "1"0 
Similar spl its among the developing s t a t e s in subsequent negotiations have 
continued to undermine the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . 1 1 
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This l e f t the African states with two options: to 
continue t o press f o r change from within the system, but in a less 
un i f i ed manner, and/or to work toward col lect ive self-reliance. 
Regionalism • as a strategy for African Development 
When i t became c l ear in the mid-1970s that the strategy of 
c o l l e c t i v e act ion would not succeed, African leaders began to give 
more attent ion t o a second strategy, co l lect ive sel f -rel iance, which 
i s a l so aimed at changing the structure of the international economic 
system. C o l l e c t i v e s e l f - r e l i a n c e is aimed at altering international 
p o l i t i c a l , economic, and soc iocultural structures so that they link 
the developing states with one another rather than to the developed 
countr ies . The goal i s economic interdependence among the developing 
s ta tes rather than the i r dependence upon the developed states. This 
interdependence i s t o be used both to promote greater trade among 
the developing states and t o enhance their col lect ive economic power— 
and hence t h e i r bargaining power—vis--a-vis the industrial states in 
order t o a l t e r what are perceived to be the external constraints on 
development. Thus, reg ional ism i s advocated as the means to achieve 
12 non-dependent development. 
For 25 years the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Afr i ca (ECA) has promoted regionalism as the preferred strategy for 
Afr ican development. To t h i s end, i t has sponsored regional institutions 
f o r educat ion , t r a i n i n g , t e chnica l services, administrative support, 
13 
and c o l l e c t i v e ac t i on . I t has also funded studies since the early 
1960s that have recommended (1 ) measures to overcome physical obstacles 
t o trade among the African s t a t e s , such as subregional transportation 
and communication networks t o l i n k African states with one another 
rather than t o t h e i r external trading partners; and (2) measures to 
uni fy smal l , economically non-viable markets, in order to encourage 
( 3 ) the organizat ion o f v i a b l e manufacturing sectors, which the ECA 
cons iders necessary f o r the transformation of African economies.14 
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According t o the ECA view, r eg i ona l groupings in Africa 
should be comprised o f a large number of s ta tes in order to "provide 
markets of suf f ic ient s i z e to ensure capacity production in industry 
15 
and other sectors of the economy." There fore , desp i te the pro-
l i feration of small, overlapping groupings, e s p e c i a l l y in West Africa, 
the ECA has worked unceasingly toward the formation o f f i v e groupings, 
but more recently f o u r 1 ' — N o r t h , West, Central , and East-and South-
that would encompass the en t i r e c o n t i n e n t , with the exception of South 
Africa. Since 1970, when the ECA m i n i s t e r i a l conference adopted a 
resolution entitled "A Development Strategy f o r A f r i ca in the 1970s," 
the ECA has per iodical ly proposed "master p lans" f o r the establish-
ment of a new international economic order in A f r i c a , and the OAU has 
in turn endorsed them as i t moved c l o s e r t o the ECA pos i t ion . In 
197 6, for example, the OAU adopted the Kinshasa Declaration, which 
called for the "progressive establishment of an Afr i can community", in 
1977 it endorsed the ECA's rev ised "master p lan" ; and in 1979 it 
organized a collaquium o f experts in Monrovia, whose recommendations 
were embodied in the 1980 Lagos Plan o f Ac t i on , c a l l i n g for the estab-17 
lishment of an African economic community by the year 2000. 
•The Lagos' Plan o f Act ion The Lagos plan o f Act ion i s an agreement that was signed by 
the African Heads of State at a spec ia l economic summit of the OAU in 
18 April, 1980. It a f f i r m s t h e i r 
corrmitment to set up by the year 2000, on the basis 
of a treaty t o be concluded, an Afr i can Economic Community 
so as to ensure the economic, s o c i a l and cul tural integra-
tion of our cont inent . The aim o f t h i s community shall 
be to promote c o l l e c t i v e , a c c e l e r a t e d , s e l f - r e l i a n t and 
self sustaining development o f Member States , co-operation 
among these States and t h e i r in tegrat ion in the economic, 
social and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s . 1 9 
This Plan o f Act ion i s t o be implemented in two stages. 
During the 1980s, ex i s t ing reg i ona l economic communities will be 
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strengthened, new reg i ona l groupings will be established, and sectoral 
integrat ion at the cont inental level will be promoted, as well as 
coordinat ion and harmonization among a l l economic groupings. During 
the D 90s, further s e c t o r a l integration will be promoted by harmonizing 
economic development plana, strategies, and po l i c ies , particularly f i s ca l 
and monetary p o l i c i e s , leading to the establishment by the year 2000 
of an Afr i can common market. 
There are well over 100 intergovernmental organizations in 
Afr i ca that dea l with a var i e ty of regional issues, including 
a g r i c u l t u r e , industry, t rade , customs, banking, transportation, 
20 
communication, heal th , natural resources, and research. The Lagos 
Plan, however, i m p l i c i t l y appl ies to three very large economic groupings, 
two of which have been created since the Plan was adopted: the Economic 
Community o f West Afr i can States (ECOWAS) whose treaty was signed in 
197 5; the Pre f e rent ia l Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern 
Afr ican States , 1981; and the Economic Community of Central African 
States (CEEAC), 1983. The potential membership of these three groups 
includes a l l Afr i can s ta tes except eight: South Africa, Namibia, 
Sudan, and f i v e North Afr i can states, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, i m . . 21 and l u n i s i a . 
While the Lagos Plan of Action is a declaration of intent 
to proceed toward s e l f - r e l i a n t development by means of regional 
cooperat ion and in tegra t i on , i t is also an economic development 
strategy at the cont inental l e v e l . Of relevance here are the recommenda-
t ions regarding industry , which clearly run counter to external pre-
s c r ip t i ons . Whereas the World Bank, for example, has urged African 
states to abo l i sh p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f s in their industrial sectors, to 
expand t h e i r exports in sectors in which they have comparative advantage 
(most o f t e n in primary commodities), and to use their increased foreign 
exchange t o import c a p i t a l and consumer goods from the most economical 
sources , the Plan has been described as "import substitution writ large 
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22 . . for the whole continent". The only d i f f e r e n c e from past po l ic ies 
is that, ratner than es tab l i sh ing industr ies t o s a t i s f y national needs, 
the African states are t o work cooperat ive ly t o s a t i s f y regional needs. 
The larger markets are intended t o support not only l i g n t industries, 
but also intermediate and heavy i n d u s t r i e s , that u l t imate ly wil l be 
allowed to develop within subregions that are pro tec ted by common 
external tar i f f s . In the meantime, every e f f o r t i s t o be made to 
increase trade within and among subregions in order to support the 
development of such industr ies . 
Intra-Regional Trade in Eastern and Southern A f r i c a 
Before proceeding t o a d i scuss ion of the formation and 
operations of the Pre ferent ia l Trade Area, a b r i e f overview follows 
of intra-regional trade in eastern and southern A f r i c a before the PTA 
was established. Also included i s a short d idcussion of structural 
constraints that inhibit expansion of i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade. 
Volumes^ of I n t r a - r e g i o n a l Trade ,^  1973-1980 
As the negot iat ions f o r the establishment o f the PTA pro-
ceeded from 1978 to 1980, i t became very c l e a r that the goal of 
reorienting the external trade of the PTA s t a t e s toward tneir regional 
partners would require a massive s t r u c t u r a l change within the region. 
Although Africa as a whole i s more highly dependent on foreign trade 
tnan any other developing region in the world, l e v e l s o f intra-African 
23 
trade in the modern era have never been high. Among the eastern and 
southern African states,1 ' ' moreover, i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade as a per-
centage of the region 's t o t a l trade has been p a r t i c u l a r l y low, accounting 24 
for only about four percent between 1973 and 1980. This has varied 
across countries, as t r a c e within the region has been quite uneven. 
The figures for the per iod 1973 t o 1980 range from a nigh of 20 per-
cent for Comoros, a small i s land economy that purchases a substantial 
share of i t s imports from Kenya, t o a low o f 0.3 percent f o r Swaziland, 
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which i s almost t o t a l l y dependent on South Africa. 
The share of intra-regional trade in total trade in the FTA 
are dropped s i g n i f i c a n t l y in 1577 when tne East African Community (LAC) 
c o l l a p s e d , as r e f l e c t e a in the following table. 
Table 1. P r e f e r e n t i a l Trace Area (original potential members) 
Trends in Total and Iritra-regional Trade, 1974-19801 
( in mi l l i ons of U.S. dollars) 
Total trade 
(exports plus 
imports) 
1974 
11,367 
1975 
10,559 
197 6 
10,42 9 
1977 
12,323 
1978 
14,012 
1979 
16,750 
19602 
20,993 
I n t r a - r e g i o n a l 
trade 691 590 613 556 407 57 9 851 
Share of i n t r a -
reg i ona l trade 
(percentage) . 6. 1 5. 6 .5. 9 4.5 2.. 9 3.5 4.1 
Source: Anjar ia , e t a l , p. 4 (see footnote 24). 
"^Zimbabwe's exports and imports are included only to the extent that they 
were shown separately in partner country s ta t i s t i c s , which distorts 
the data to some extent , part icularly after the 1980 normalization 
of trading r e l a t i o n s with Zimbabwe. 
2 . . Preliminary estimates. 
*Note that the s t a t i s t i c s used in this section include trade figures for 
p o t e n t i a l PTA s t a t e s that have not yet joined (Angola, Botswana, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sychel les) , and omit those for Rwanda 
and Burundi, which were not or ig inal ly expected to become PTA member 
s ta tes . 
After the i r common boruer was c losed , both Kenya ana eanzania increased 
the i r trade with non-African s ta tes , which had a significant impact 
on i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade as a whole because of the high volumes pre-
v ious ly traded among the LAC partners. 
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As the f i gures f o r 1980 in Table 2 below i n d i c a t e , the values 
of intra-regional trade vary enormously among PTA s ta tes . 
Table 2. Preferential Trade Area Countries ( p o t e n t i a l members) 
Value of. I n t r a - r e g i o n a l Trade, 1980 
. . . (in .milli <?ns . of U.. S.. d o l l a r s ) . . . . . . 
Country Exports t o Region Imports from Region 
Angola 0. 5 6. 0 
Botswana 4 .0 5. 0 
Comoros 0. 5 8 .1 
Djibouti 0 .2 10. 0 
Ethiopia 38. 6 7 .8 
Kenya 234. 5 67. 9 
Lesotho - 0 .1 
Madagascar 3 .4 13. 5 
Malawi 19.7 22. 6 
Mauritius 4.7 22.0 
Mozambique 19. 6 32. 2 
Seychelles 0.7 2 .4 
Somalia 0. 8 30.7 
Swaziland 1 .0 2 .1 
Tanzania 38. 0 26. 7 
Uganda 6.0 178.6 
Zambia 19.3 23. 8 
Zimbabwe ' 107.7 • - 97 . 9 
Total 499.2 557,4 
(Source: Anjaria, p. 30) 
There are clearly two dominant economies, Kenya and Zimbabwe, which run 
favourable (and in the case of Kenya, s u b s t a n t i a l ) balances with the 
region as a whole. Although Tanzania ran a d e f i c i t with Kenya in 1980, 
this was of fset by i t s trade surpluses with Mozambique, Uganda, and 
Zambia, so that Tanzania was a net exporter t o the reg ion . Ethiopia 
was also a net exporter , because of D j i b o u t i ' s dependence on Ethiopian 
commodities. All other s t a t e s were net importers , with Uganda 
suffering the largest r e g i o n a l d e f i c i t due t o i t s heavy reliance on Kenya 
for both imports and t r a n s i t goods. Between 197 6 and 1980 (except in 
25 
1978), Kenya provided 40 to 50 percent of Uganda's imports , and Kenya's 
export levels to Uganda averaged over 63 m i l l i o n Kenya shi l l ings annually 
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between 1980 and 1984. 2 6 
As indicated by the figures in Table 3 bel>w, Kenya's valu^ 
of i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade f o r the period 1373-197 9 was the highest 
in the PTA r e g i o n , over 33 percent of values traded (excluding 
Zimbabwe), although i t s share of intra-regional to total trade places 
i t f i f t h among other s ta tes . * Until the collapse of the 
Table 3. P r e f e r e n t i a l Trade Area Countries (potential members) 
Involvement in Intra-regional Trade 
Annual Average 197 3-197 9 ' 
Share of 
Value of 
In t ra - reg i ona l 
Trade' 
Intra-regional 
Trade in 
Own Total 
Trade .. . 
US$ mi l l i on Tank Per'Cent Rank 
Angola 8. 9 11 0. 5 16 
Botswana 7 . 4 12 1. 6 13 
Comoros 4. 0 16 14. 3 3 
Dj ibouti 24. 3 6 14. 6 2 
Ethiopia 29.1 5 4. 6 8 
Kenya 204. 9 1 11. 5 5 
Lesotho 0 17 - 17 
Madagascar 7 .0 13 1.1 15 
Malawi 16.7 8 4. 6 9 
Mauritius 15. 6 9 2.3 12 
Mozambique 19.4 7 2.7 10 
Seychelles 6. 8 14 14.1 4 
Somalia 15.0 10 5.1 7 
Swaziland 4. 6 15 1.3 14 
Tanzania 88. 9 3 7.6 6 
Uganda 103.1 2 17.0 1 
Zambia 47. 9 4 . 2. 6 11 
(Source: Anjaria , p. 5) 
,-{Note that these f i g u r e s are somewhat distorted, as Table 3 does not 
inc lude s t a t i s t i c s f o r Zimbabwe because of the embargo prior to i ts 
independence in 1980. From the figures for 1980 in Table 2 above, 
which include Zimbabwe, Kenya's share of values tradea in the FTA 
region was 23.6 p e r c e n t , Zimbabwe's was 19.5 percent, and the three 
former EAC countr ies together accounted for 52.2 percent. 
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East African Community, trade among the three partner states accounted 
for three-f i fths of trade within the PTA region (again excluding 
27 Zimbabwe), and Kenya's favourable balances with Tanzania and Uganda 
28 were always substantial . 
As shown in Table 4 below, the sahre o f Kenya's intra-
regional trade r e l a t i v e to i t s t o t a l trade began to decl ine after the 
f i r s t o i l -pr i ce increase in 1973, which resu l ted in a contraction of 
foreign exchange reserves and hence manufacturing output. With the 
break-up of the EAC and the c l osure o f the border between Kenya and 
Tanzania, Kenya l o s t not only the Tanzanian market, but the Zambian 
as well. Consequently, Kenya's share of i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade to total 
trade dropped p r e c i p i t o u s l y , as d id Tanzania's and, temporarily, 
Uganda's. Kenya immediately began t o search f o r new regional markets 
and gradually increased i t s exports t o Rwanda and Burundi within the 
PTA region and to Sudan, Za i re , and Egypt outs ide the region. By 1980 
Kenya's share of i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade t o t o t a l trade had climbed back 
to i t s 1977 level. 
Table 4. East African Community Countries 
Intra-Regional .Trade.as .Percent .of . Total .Trade. 1973-80. 
'1973 1974 ' ;197 5 1 97 6 ' 1977 ' 1978 '1979' '1980 
Kenya 17.3 14.1 14.0 13.8 8. 3 6.3 6 .1 8.7 
Tanzania 13.3 10. 5 9.0 10. 5 3.7 2.0 3.4 3 .3 
Uganda 17.1 17.2 15.6 15.9 17.7 4 .5 13.5 19.0 
(Source: Anjaria, pp. 28-29) 
'Obstacles 'to • Intra-Re^ionai Trade 
The transportat ion and communication networks inherited by 
African states at independence were geared t o move exports to Africa 's 
ports for transshipment to Europe. Consequently, l i n k s among some 
PTA states are simply not adequate t o f a c i l i t a t e intra-regional trade. 2 9 
Although the PTA i s g iv ing t ranspor tat i on within the region second 
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p r i o r i t y a f t e r in t ra - reg iona l liberalization of trade, and feasibility-
studies on 60 p r o j e c t s have been completed and submitted to aid donors 
30 
f o r c ons idera t i on , improvement of the basic infrastructure wi l l be a 
very long-term undertaking. Several sets of negotiations among the for -
mer LAC partners and Rwanda and Burundi since 1984 have produced 
agreements t o reopen and improve transport arrangements in the northern 
c o r r i d o r , but t h i s has merely served to reinstate the network that had 
been in p lace be fo re the collapse of the East African Community. In 
the southern part o f the region, the members of the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) have been grappling with 
the t ransportat ion problem since their grouping was formed in 1979, 
as they have attempted t o reorient their trade away from South Africa. 
Thus f a r , however, l i t t l e has been accomplished beyond further studies, 
as renovation o f Mozambique's railroads, the corc of SADCC's iiimediate 
p lans , has been sabotaged periodically by the Mozambique National 31 Resistance (MNR) as part o f South Africa 's destabilization strategy. 
The heavy r e l i a n c e of most PTA states on one or two export 
commodities i s another constraint. As a result of the region's pro-
duct ion s t r u c t u r e , and of the preferences granted to African states 
under the Lome Conventions and the EEC . transfers of funds intended 
to compensate f o r the deter iorat ion of commodity prices, the EEC has 
increas ingly become an important export market. 
With the exception of Zimbabwe, which has a relatively 
d i v e r s i f i e d production base , primary products are the major source 
of export earnings f o r a l l PTA members. Given tiiis complementarity 
in product ion , the scope f o r expansion of intra-regional trade is 
' ' largely confined to non-tradit ional products, partiCularly'manufactures 
and bas i c f o o d s t u f f s . Tor this reason, Kenya, and to a lesser extent 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania, w i l l benefit from a larger regional market. How-
ever , the problem of excess capacity must also be taken into account, 
e s p e c i a l l y in f oo twear , c l o th ing , cement, and furniture. Excess 
capac i ty in the region increased after the demise of the EAC, as both 
Kenya and Tanzania attempted t o become independent of each other 's markets 
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A further constra int on the expansion of intra-regional 
trade is the fact that most s ta tes in the region maintain high tar i f f 
barriers to protect their l o c a l industr ies . This has been a disincen-
tive for local industries t o d i v e r s i f y product ion , improve quality, 
and beco»e competitive wi'ch suppl iers from outs ide the region. Further, 
most states, prior to j o i n i n g the PTA, did not g i v e reg ional preferences. 
The most important exception i s the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f Lesotho and 
Swaziland (and Botswana, a non-PTA member) in the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU). With a common t a r i f f and no r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
goods moving between i t s members, the customs union provided in the 
years prior to 1980 about 50 percent o f government revenues in Swaziland 
35 
and up to 7 5 percent in Lesotho. In re cogn i t i on of how d i f f i c u l t i t 
will be for these states t o r eor i ent t h e i r trade toward the PTA, the 
Treaty granst them "temporary except ions" while they remain participants 
in SACU.36 
The subregion a l s o s u f f e r s from poor communications, weak 
links among essential s e r v i c e s that f a c i l i t a t e trade such as banking 
and insurance, and a lack o f coordinat ion among s ta tes with regard to 
customs regulations and documentation. 
Finally, there "ire f o r e i g n currency constra ints in most 
PTA states that are only part ia l l i* addressed by the establishment of 
the PTA Clearing House ( t o be discussed below). Lack of convertible 
currency serves to reduce import capac i ty g e n e r a l l y , and i s also 
reflected in reduced indust r ia l output and lower volumes o f intra-
regional trade. 
j - ^ i i ^ i c " t h e 'PTA. 
' Fotfflaticn "of; the PTA 
The creation o f the PTA grew out of the long-term strategy 
37 
of the ECA to create two l a r g e reg iona l groupings , one in eastern 
Africa, the other in southern A f r i c a , and out o f the co l lapse of the 
East African Community in 1977. Soon a f t e r the EAC1 s demise, leaders 
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from both areas met and discussed the formation of a larger single 
group that would serve to reduce the significance of disputes among 
the East Afr i can s tates . In early 1978 the region's ministers of trade, 
f i n a n c e , and planning adopted the Lusaka Declaration of Intent and 
Commitment on the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for 
Eastern and Southern Afr ican States. This document outlined plans for 
mure than in t ra - reg i ona l l ibera l i zat ion of trade, as the name might 
imply. I t envisaged a s e r i e s of steps toward the creation of a 
common market and the eventual establishment of a regional economic 
38 community. 
It was o r i g i n a l l y intended that the draft treaty would be 
ready f o r s igning by early 1980, but negotiations took a year longer 
than ant i c ipated . Seven negotiating meetings were held between March 
1978 and June 1980, at which agreement was ultimately reached on a l l 
but f i v e P r o t o c o l s , which re la ted to the rules of origin, clearing and 
payments arrangements, the BLS states, reduction of trade barriers, 
39 
and the l i s t o f commodities to be traded within the PTA. The lack 
oi consensus on the contested issues grew in part out of the asymmetrical 
l e v e l s ol development among the PTA states. Experience in other 
p r e f e r e n t i a l and f r e e trade areas has shown that this leads to the more 
i n d u s t r i a l l y advanced s t a t e s , in this case Kenya and Zimbabwe, not 
only running favourable trade balances against their less developed 
partners , but a l s o t reat ing them as captive markets for their manufac-
tured goods. In the PTA c a s e , industrial development among the member 
s tates v a r i e s enormously, ranging from Djibouti and Ethiopia, which 
" ( d o ) not at present have any goods 'originating' in their territories 40 to export to the other Member States," to Kenya and Zimbabwe, whose 
indus t r ia l production accounts f o r 13 and 25 percent of GDP, respecti-
41 
ve ly . Disagreement a l so grew out of the varied po l i t i ca l and economic 
systems o f the member s t a t e s , ranging from soc ia l is t Ethiopia and 
Tanzania, where indus t r ia l production is for the most part controlled 
by the s t a t e , to Zimbabwe and Kenya, where market forces are allowed 
f r e e r r e i n , and where f o r e i g n d i r e c t investment is a significant factor. 
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Perhaps the most content ious of the unresolved i s s u e s , and 
the most pertinent to this d i s c u s s i o n , was the Pro to co l on the Rules 
of Origin. Those states that own and cont ro l t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l sectors , 
such as Ethiopia and Tanzania, wished to avoid two t y p i c a l consequences 
of creating a preferential trade area without appropriate safeguards: 
that non-nationals, i . e . , f o re ign i n v e s t o r s , w i l l attempt t o secure 
42 
its benefits, anc} that ( e l i g i b l e ) traders w i l l seek t o obtain regional 
preferences for ine l ig ib le goods. Kenya and Zimbabwe agreed that the 
rules should benefit only local ly-owned f i r m s , but arguea that they 
needed time to restructure ownership and management in the i r foreign-
dominated industrial sectors . 
The rules of o r i g i n that were ul t imate ly adopted are of two 
types. The f i r s t is aimed at preventing external i n t e r e s t s from 
securing benefits at the expense o f PTA members. I t de f ines as e l ig ib le 
for PTA preferences those enterpr ises whose ownership and management are 
at least 51 percent l o ca l l y c o n t r o l l e d . This requires that at least 51 
percent of the equity of a irm be held by a nat ional or nationals of 
a member state, its governmant, or an agent of i t s government, and that 
management of the firm be l o c a l i z e d by the same percentage. 
The second type of r u l e i s intended to ensure that goods 
and commodities that re ce ive p r e f e r e n t i a l t a r i f f treatment within 
the subregion are actually e n t i t l e d to them. Products that are 
el igible for reduced t a r i f f s f a l l into two ca tegor i e s . The f i r s t 
contains products that are "wholly obtained" from a member state . 
These are defined as products that have been grown, harvested, or 
43 
extracted in a PTA state or manufactured without imported content. 
The second category includes products that contain imported materials 
or components that have been transformed by l o c a l process ing . To be 
el igible for preferential treatment, however, 
transformation i s regarded as being s u f f i c i e n t i f the 
value of imported materials and components does not 
exceed 60 percent of the t o t a l c o s t o f materials used 
in production o f the goods , or i f the value added in 
the process o f production accounts f o r at l e a s t 45 
percent of the t o t a l e x - f a c t o r y c o s t o f the f i n a l 
goods. 
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Because o f reservations about the rules of origin an_ cer-
ta in other P r o t o c o l s , only ten of the 13 (subsequently 20) potential 
members signed the Treaty on December 21, 1981. Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and 
45 
Zimbabwe. Lesotho and Swaziland reportedly hesitated, and Botswmr. 
in f a c t d e c l i n e d , to sign the Treaty, which was attributed to their 
membership with South A f r i c a in SACU and their uncertainty about how 
the i r j o in ing the PTA in i t s early stages would affect their r e l a t i o n 
with South A f r i ca . Lesotho and Swaziland signed the Treaty, however, 
and subsequently sc did Comoros, Djibouti, and two late-comers, Rwane;a 46 and Burundi, bringing the number of signatories to 14. 
The f i f t e e n t h member, Tanzania, did not sign the Treaty 
u n t i l March, 1985. When i t s representative announced in 1981, on the 
day be f o re the Treaty was due to be signed, that Tanzania would not 
sign the document, i t was stated that Tanzania needed more time to 
study the e f f e c t s o f PTA membership on its commitments as a member of 
the Front i ine States ana SADCC. At that time, the settJement of the 
assets and l i a b i l i t i e s o f the Last African Community had not been 
completed, and the border between Kenya and Tanzania remained closed. 
President Nyerere of Tanzania was on record as having said that the 
border would not be reopened unti l a settlement was made, and he 
reportedly prevai led on Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, and the Seychel 
47 
t o r e f r a i n from signing the PTA Treat as well. Even after the EAC 
matter was well on i t s way toward resolution, however, ana the border 
had been reopened, Tanzania remained reluctant to join the PTA. While 
s t i l l cons ider ing such a move in April, 1984, Nyerere stated, " I f we 
have doubts about our a b i l i t y t o carry out the commitments of an 48 
agreement, we would rather not enter into i t " . It is likely that 
Tanzania's experience in the LAC and dissatisfaction with the comnioditi 
contained in the Common List ( t o be aiscussed below) greatly influence 
th is p o s i t i o n . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, however, that even after 
s igning the Treaty, Tanzania did not begin to use the PTA Clearin,; 
uq ° house f a c i l i t i e s u n t i l a f t e r mid-1986. * 
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There are s t i l l f i v e p o t e n t i a l members o f the PTA: Angola 
Botswana, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Seychel les , iingola participated 
in the negotiations f o r both CLEAC anu PTA, and although i t s rep-
50 
resentative indicated that Angola would eventually 30m CLLAC, 
i t is unlikely that Angola wants to a l ienate i t s cc-members in SADCC, 
five of whan are PTA members, by j o i n i n g another economic grouping, 
botswana, a member of SACU and heavily dependent on traue witn Soutn 
nfrica, i s more committed t o r eor i en t ing i t s trade r eg i ona l l y within 
the framework of SADCC than to j o in ing PTA. As the l a t e President 
of Botswana, Sir Seretse \noma, stated the case , " In t ra - reg iona l trade 
can increase without tne creat ion of a f r ee trade area or a common 
market." Citing the experience of SADCC s ta tes in defunct economic 
unions and in SACU, he noted that " a l l have served t o l i m i t our develop-
ment, to enrich externally based f irms and i n t e r e s t s , and to hamper 
national planning."51 The economy of the third p o t e n t i a l PlA member, 
Mozambique, has suffered so s e v e r e l y , f i r s t from years of c i v i l war, 
then climatic factors and cngoing d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n by the MNR, that i t 
is doubtful tnat a dec is ion about j o in ing tue PTA i s nign on i t s 
agenda. Mozambique has a l so entered i n t o severa l barter traae agree-
ments with Tanzania, and, due to i t s lack o f f o re ign exchange and i t s 52 
negative trade balance wi ch neighboring s t a t e s , i t i s not likely that 
Mozambique will soon be able t o undertake the commitments required by 
the PTA. Madagascar and Seychel les are small economies whose snares of 
intra-regional trade as percentages of t h e i r t o t a l trade are quite low 53 and, in the case of Seychel les , de c l in ing . 
Despite the uncertainty about i t s ult imate membership, the 
P1A came into being in September, 1983 , upon the r a t i f i c a t i o n of i t s 
Treaty by more than seven s ta tes . I t s design-with regard to trade i s 
to accord preferential treatment t o goods o r i g i n a t i n g in member states 
relative to non-members' goous. T a r i f f s w i l l gradually be reduced on 
6oods produced within tne subregion , maKing them more competitive than 
goods imported from outside the P r e f e r e n t i a l Trade- Area.- ( See the dis-
cussion below on t a r i f f reduct ions and the Common Lis t . ) 
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I n i t i a l l y , t h e r e f o r e , the PlA w i l l be more limi'tec tnan, 
but w i l l work toward becoming, a f r e e trade area, whicn is charact .r i - j. 
54 
by f r e e i n t e r n a l l t a r i f f , " whicn would upgrade the P'lA to tne 
status of a customs union. I t a l s o c a l l s f o r the eventual establish-
ment of a common market, which would require unrestricted intern.--
movement o f c a p i t a l and labour ; and the ult imate establishment or an 
economic community, which would add monetary and f i s c a l union. 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y the PTA i s s imi lar to LCOWAS, witn u i t i . - t 
dec is ion-making power r e s i d i n g in an Authority comprised or trie tleaus 
of-. .-State and Government, which must meet once a year. Lacii year, 
r o t a t i o n , one of these leaders becomes tne Chairman of the- PTA. ueiow 
the Authoity i s a Council o f Ministers made up o f ministers of trade 
and f inance from the member s t a t e s . The Counci l meets at least twice 
a year and i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r reviewing the operations of the comi.iunit 
and making recommendations t o the Keaas o f State on matters of policy. 
An execut ive o f f i c e r , tne Secretary e n e r a l o f the PTA, has been 
55 
appointed , and headquarters have been establ ished in Lusaka, Ztmbi... 
Actual implementation o f PTA p o l i c i e s i s being hanalea by an Inter-
governmental Commission of Experts a s s i s t e d by Several technical 
committers charged with such matters as trade and customs, clearin 
and payments, a g r i c u l t u r e , indus t ry , t r a n s p o r t , anc communications. 
Disputes amon^ member s t a t e s w i l l be a d j u d i c a t e c by a Tribunal appoint. 
5 (3 
t>y the Authority . In a d d i t i o n , two PTA - r e l a t e d institutions havo 
been c r e a t e d , the- PTa M u l t i - l a t e r a l Clearing F a c i l i t y ana tne PTA Trac. 
arid Development bank, both of which w i l l be discussed below. 
Unlike LCOV.AS ana the de funct Last African Community, tne 
Sec re tar ia t of- the PTA i s t o be kept r e l a t i v e l y smail , altnou; noc 
so small as tnat o f SADCC, wnich i s almost non-existent . As of niid-
1986, the s t a f f o f the PTA was comprised o f ' 'about 14 professionals. ' 
Consultants irom within ane without tne subregion are usee on a 
short - term b a s i s , however, and a great dea l o f technical assistance is 
a l s o p i w i d o d hy tne Mul t inat iona l Programming and Co-operation Centre 
(MULPOC) o f the LCa, which i s bas ,a in L u s a k a . " 
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Operations o f t he_ PTA 
The PTA Treaty establ i shed the P r e f e r e n t i a l Trade Area "as 
a f i r s t step towards the establishment o f a Common Market ana even-
tually of an Economic Community f o r Eastern and Southern African States." 
The f inal step toward common market status was o r i g i n a l l y to be 
considered by the Council in 1991, with a target date o f 1992. While 
the time-table undoubtedly w i l l be changed, as w i l l be discussed below, 
the ultimate goal w i l l s t i l l be approached in s t a g e s , 
beginning with i n t e r - l i n k a g e s among the part ic ipat ing 
countries in those s e c t o r s amenable t o quick results 
and building on successes thus achieved t o higher 
stages of economic in tegrat ion . 
Therefore, the major emphasis in the f i r s t stage i s t o be the promotion 
of intra-regional trace , with secondary emphasis on expansion and 
harmonization of the a g r i c u l t u r a l and indus t r ia l se c tors that supply 
trade, and improvement of i n t r a - r e g i o n a l transport l inks that fac i l i tate 
.. 60 i t . 
The in i t ia l steps toward the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of trade require 
member states to : 
— reduce and f i n a l ly el iminate customs duties in respect of 
selected commodities produced in the area; 
— establish appropriate payment and c lear ing arrangements 
among themselves that would f a c i l i t a t e trade in goods 
and services; 
— intensify co -operat ion in the f i e l d s of transport and 
communications; 
—s impl i fy and harmonise the i r trade documents ana procedures, 
standardise the manufacture and qua l i ty of gooes produced 
in the area; 
— abolish quantitat ive and administrat ive r e s t r i c t i o n s on trade 
among themselves (such as tne imposit ion of quotas, f or 
instance); 
promote d irect exchange o f information among the i r commercial 
and industrial organizations^ 
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enact laws and regulat ions f a c i l i t a t i n g transit trad*. witMn 
the p r e f e r e n t i a l trade area, while establishing conditions 
regulat ing the re - expor t o f products within the region, 
progress ive ly adapt t h e i r commercial pol ic ies in accordance 
with the prev is ions o f the PTn treaty. 
With the exception o f measures t o standardize the manufac-
ture and qual i ty of goods produced in the subregion, many important 
steps have been taken in a l l o f these areas. This discussion wi l l 
f o c u s , however, only on the most contentious us sues and some of the 
more d i f f i c u l t t e chn i ca l o b s t a c l e s encountered during the f i r s t thrt.' 
years o f the PTA's operat ions . A short d iscuss ion of the clearing 
and payments arrangements i s provided f i r s t in order to describe the 
procedures and consider the r esu l t s . 
The PTA Clearing House 
On February 1 , 1984, in preparation f o r the operational 
phase o f the PTA, a M u l t i l a t e r a l Clearing F a c i l i t y , or Clearing house, 
was e s t a b l i s h e d , using the f a c i l i t i e s of the Rpservfe Bank of siinbabwe. 
The l a t t e r i s being paid by the PTA to s e t t l e the trade accounts f o r 
member s t a t e s , although at a future date the Clearing House may become 
62 
an independent i n s t i t u t i o n . because the operation of the Clearir.c, 
Houst was hampered at the s t a r t , however, by poor management and co-or-
d i n a t i o n , a Manager was appointed in May, 1986, t o oversee operations, 
which was expected t o improvt performance. 
In a d d i t i o n , a new monetary unit has been created, the UAPTA 
(Unit o f Account o f the PTA), s imi lar in concept to the IMF's Special 
Drawing Right (SDR). Pegged to the SDR, the UAPTA is quoted daily 
against the currenc ies of member s tates and i s being used to record 
S 3 
trade deb i t s and c r e d i t s among them. Each member state has a net 
deb i t l i m i t , the amount i t can owe other s t a t e s , and a net credit l imit , 
the amount i t can be owed, which r e f l e c t past volumes of trade within 
the subregion. The c r e d i t l i m i t i s 25 percent of the average value 
o f a s t a t e ' s t o t a l annual subregional trade (exports and imports) for 
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the previous three-year per i od ; the deb i t l i m i t i s 20 percent of that 
figure. The limits f o r the f i r s t y e a r , e f f e c t i v e February 1 , 1984, 
are shown in Table 5 on the f o l l owing .page . 
No funds actual ly pass through the Clearing House. Its 
function is to record in UAPTA a l l t ransact ions among members and 
balance the books every two months. Day-to-day transact ions are 
invoiced ana paid through the commercial banks o f the subregion--
just as they would be f o r a l l trade d e a l s , except that they arc 
denominated in the national currency o f the expor ter , or in UAPTA, and 
no foreign exchange is handled by the commercial banks. Rather, 
after the importer has paid h is own bank in l o c a l currency f o r the 
goods, his banx instructs the e x p o r t e r ' s bank to pay the exporter in 
his local currency and at the same time replenishes that currency in 
the account of the expor ter ' s bank through a funding arrangement with 
the central bank in the importing country. The centra l banks in both 
countries report this d e b i t / c r e d i t to the Clearing House, which, at the 
end of each two-month transact ion p e r i o d , balances the accounts in UAPTA. 
The central banks of the net debtor s t a t e s are then required to 
settle their negative balances in hard currency through the U. S. 
Reserve Bank in New York. Settlements must be made within 15 days, 
and members face progressive ra tes o f i n t e r e s t , suspension, from the 
Clearing House, and nSuch add i t i ona l sanct ions as may be contained in 
the rules and regulations prescr ibed by the (Clearing and Payments) 
Committee" i f they f a i l t o s e t t l e the i r accounts within the prescribed 
period. 
While there are c l e a r bene f i t s t o a l l p a r t i e s in this arrange-
ment, there are also some serioud problems. On the p o s i t i v e side, the 
exporter invoices in his own currency and i s protec ted from later 
fluctuations in exchange ra t es . He a l s o r e c e i v e s prompt ^payment, once 
the importer has paid the i n v o i c e , even i f the importing s tate is slow 
in settling i ts Clearing House account. I d e a l l y , the importer, too , 
should be relieved of some o f the consequences of f o r e i g n exchange 
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Table 5. P r e f e r e n t i a l Trade Area Mul t i l a tera l Clearing Facil.it> Net 
Credit and Debit L imits , Feb. 1934, in.UAPTA .000'.s. 
Country Credit 'Limit Debit Limit Share 
Eurunai 
Comoros 
Dj ibout i 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Rwanda 
Somalia 
Swaziland 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
5. 310 
1.110 
13.963 
9. 535 
57.183 
0. 268 
10. 280 
4. 203 
11.193 
4. 455 
1. 763 
28.255 
18.528 
23.. 370 
4. 248 
0. 888 
11.170 
7. 708 
45. 746 
0. 214 
8. 224 
3. 362 
8. 954 
3. 564 
1. 410 
22.604 
14.822 
18.. 696 
2.8 
. 6 
7.4 
5.1 
30. 2 
.1 
5.4 
2.2 
5. 9 
2.4 
. 9 
14. 9 
9.8 
12. 3 . 
18 9,516 151.510 
Note: Tanzania was not ye t a member 
(Source: PTA i i u l t i l a t e r a l Clearing F a c i l i t y 
Operational Procedures Manual, January 1984) 
100.. 0 
shortages in his own country, as the importing state enjoys a foreign 
exchange savings i f i t has maintained a general balance between imports 
and exports . F i n a l l y , member s ta tes that are net importers receive up 
to 7 5 days of i n t e r e s t - f r e e c r e d i t (two-month transaction period plus 
15 days f o r set t lement) be fo re they are required to settle their 
negative balances in hard c u r r e n c i e s , which serves to provide them wieL 
add i t i ona l l i q u i d i t y . A l l these measures should fa c i l i ta te increases 
in i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade. 
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Most states in the PTA, however, f a c e severe foreign currency 
constraints and are hard-pressed t o meet short deadlines to pya for 
trade def ic i ts . Some o. the hardest -h i t are the same states that run 
chronic trade de f i c i t s with the ir reg ional partners. Gambia, for 
example, suffered a $ m i l l i o n d e f i c i t with Zimbabwe during the f i r s t 
65 
six months of the Clearing House's operat ions . When Zimbabwe took no 
steps to increase i t s imports from Zambia, the l a t t e r retal iated by 
66 
substantially reducing x 3 imports from Zimbabwe, thereby reducing 
its ratio of intra-regional trade to t o t a l trade—a step backward in terms 
of the goals of the PTA. There are a l s o p o t e n t i a l problems for the 
net exporting states. F:uist, although an exporter i s protected from 
fluctuating exchange r a t e s , his member s ta te is not . Countries such 
Kenya and Zimbabwe that maintain f l e x i b l e exchange rates may suffer 
losses when their accounts are balanced with s ta tes whose currencies 
67 
are overvalued. Second, many f irms in Kenya and Zimbabwe produce 
goods that contain high percentages of imported raw materials and 
components, which must be oaid f o r in hard currenc ies . Ideal ly , PTA 
preferences could encoura:e these f irms to increase t h e i r local inputs, 
which would eventually rt . 'uce the importance o f th i s problem. In the 
meantime, however, a not uncommon view i s that " b a r t e r ( i n g ) these goods 
through the PTA payment system Afould c o n s t i t u t e a arain o n . . . 
foreign exchange."^ 
These problem • are r e f l e c t e d in the f a c t that only UAPTA 
42.8 million in tota l trade transact ions were channelled through the 
Clearing House in i t s f i r s t year of operat ion. Given the total debit 
and credit limits that had — been establ ished y which "themselves were set i 
at 20 and 25 percent, r e s p e c t i v e l y , o f avorage annual aubregional trade, 
"this meant that :>nly about 20% of the p o t e n t i a l o f the clearing fa c i l i t y 
6° 
had been used.11 ~ The same underlying problems are a l so ref lected in 
the high percentage of trade d e f i c i t s that had t o be se t t l ed in con-
vertible currenci.es during the f i r s t two and one -ha l f years of the 
Clearing House's operations ( see Table 6 on the f o l l owing page), although 
i t should be noted that these percentages began to d e c l i n e in 
September, 198 6. (Several reasons f o r t h i s improvement w i l l be 
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discussed below. ) 
Table 6. PTA Clearing House Transact ions, Feb. 1984 - Apr. 1987 
( i n UAPTA m i l l i o n s ) 
Gross Trade Net Settlement I Settled 
Financed through in Foreign in Foreign 
Clearing House' Exchange Exchange 
Total f o r 
Transaction Period 
Feb 1984 2 . 1 
Mar' _ \J3.5_ '• 7 5 - 6 7" _ 3 ' ' 7 " 77 7' 7_23\.2 
Apr ' 2 .8 ' 
May 4 .9 7 .7 • • • _5.4 70.1 
Jun 5. 6 
•Jul "J '7J4.1 9.'7 ' ' .••• " * y . • " "9.1- ; • ' ' J33.8 
Aug" 4*. 5 * . . 
Sep 2.0 6;5 . '6.0" 92.3' 
"Set " " "5.1 " . 
'Nov ' ' 7. 5 ' ' 5. 9' ' 78.7 
Dec 0.'2 ' ' ' ' " " . 
•Jan 1985 5.6 5.8 5.0 86.2 
Feb V.'ST" " ' ' "" " ' " 
Mar 1.6 5. 5 5.0 90. 9 
Apr " 2.8 ' ' * - - - - - -
May • ' 3.7 • 6.5 J 5.6 86.2 
J'un ' 4.8" 
'Jul 2 . 9 " "7.7 "6.8 88.3' 
Aug' ' 7. 2 
Sep ' 3.3 10 .5 " 8 .9 84.8 
Oct ' " 6 . 5 " * " ' 
Nov 4 .2 • 1C.7 _ 9.1 _ 85.1 
DOC ~2.4 ' * 2 . 4 * '* •*'" ' l .T" : * ' " T T T S 
Jan' 1986" 1. 9 " " " " ' 
'Feb 1 .9 3.8 '2 .9 76; 3' ' 
Mar " 2.8 ' ' '" " ' — — -
Apr ' ' 2 .0 4.8 _  3.8 79.2 
May " 4.4 * - - . . . - . .„ • — • 
Jon 8. 9 13. 3 6.1 45. 9' 
Jul' ' ' "3.'6*" " ' " '. w^-a — 
A u g ; "2.8 •_ ' 6.4 J * 7 _ 7 1 - 2 " / 65.6-
Step 6'.*3 " " ' " * ' ~ 
Oct 8. 5 14.8 7.4 50.0 
Nov""" 6.8 " " ' * ' " " " — 
'Dec • 9.5 16.3 6.3 38.7 
Jan 19&V "6.9 ~ 
Fob 4 .0 10.9 3 .2 29.4 
Mar 7 . 3 " — - . . • — — — 
,APr . 7 7 7 .13,1.. L 77 .7..7-7... 7"6-P777 77 7 ' 
(Source: PTA Clearing house) 
- 25 - IDS/WP 453 
The low value of trade t ransac t i ons in the f i r s t two years 
also re f lec ts the fact that most o f the member s tates were slow to 
begin active participation in the PTA. Only s i x s ta tes— Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Zambia, ana Zimbabwe— used the Clearing 
71 
House f a c i l i t i e s during the f i r s t s ix months o f i t s operations. 
The high percentages o f f o r e i g n exchange required to settle 
trade de f i c i t s also ind icate a s i g n i f i c a n t imbalance o f trade within 
the region. In 1984 the imbalance was primari ly between Zimbabwe and 
its trading partners, as :Cenya d i rec ted only s ix transact ions through 
72 
the Clearing House during the f i r s t year. Kenya increased i ts export 
transactions to 53 in 198 i, valued at jus t over KSh. 13.5 millioni and 
increased them again in 199 6 t o 60, although the value dropped to 73 
slightly more than KSh. 12 m i l l i o n . These low va lues , approximately 
UAPTA .8 and . 635 mi l l i on r e s p e c t i v e l y , were only small fractions of the 
the totals traded through the Clearing House in those years , UAPTA 
48.9 million in 1985 and JAPTA 59.4 m i l l i o n in 1986. In fa c t , 
they represent only .5 md .4 percent o f Kenya's exports to the PTA 74 
states in 198 5 and 198 6, r e s p e c t i v e l y , and ind i cate that Kenyan 
businessmen were very slow to use the PTA c l ear ing f a c i l i t y . In the 
f i r s t six months of 1987, however, the export t ransac t i ons that Kenyan 
firms were to channel th 'ough the Clearing House jumped t o 277, valued 75 
at almost KSh. 52 m i l l i o n , approximately UAPTA 2.5 mi l l i on . From 
these figures, it i s c l e a r that Kenya's trade w i l l now begin to further 
increase the imbalance of trade handled by the PTA c l ear ing f a c i l i t y . 
While periodic p u b l i c a t i o n o f the Clearing House settlements, 
as reproduced in Table 6 above, served t o confirm the f e a r s of the less-
developed states chat Kenya and Zimbabwe would dominate the PTA to the 
detriment of the weaker economies, those two s ta tes continued to insist 
that the rules of or ig in should be modif ied to a l l ow t h e i r foreign-
owned industries to p a r t i c i p a t e . After record ing only s i x PTA transac-
tions in 1984, the Kenya Ministry o f Coirmerce announced in January, 
198 5, that Kenya had requested a reduct ion from 51 t o 30 percent in the 
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7 6 77 l o c a l equity-ownership r u l e . The Ministry then undertook a survey 
whose r e s u l t s appeared to support tneKenya position. The results 
indicated that "77.4% of a l l intra-? . T. A. exports (reported in tne 
survey) f o r the year 1983" had been made by foreign-controlled firms 
tnat did not q u a l i f y to trade through the Clearing House. While these 
78 
r e s u l t s should be treated with extreme caution, they do indicate that 
a nigh proport ion of Kenyan f irms had been excluded from participation 
in the PTA. 
As we have seen, the issue of how to frame the rules of origin 
had been one o f the most contentious during the negotiations to 
e s t a b l i s h the PTA, and there was considerable resistance to derogation of 
the ownersnip ru l e . Nonetneless, the PTA Inter-governmental Commission or 
Experts undertook a study and recommended to the Council of Ministers 
in J u l y , 198 5, that the member states accept "a general derogation of 
equity from 51 per cent to 30 per cent''1 and lower percentages for 
79 
Comoros, D j i b o u t i , and- the BLS states. This compromise would have 
served to g i v e a small advantage to the less-developed states—although non-
s i g n i f i c a n t in the f a c e o f e entry into PTA trade on tne part of large 
foreign-owned f irms in Kenya and Zimbabwe—in return for allowing time 
l o r Kenya and Zimbabwe ' ' to mobil ise resources to acquire the 51 per cent 80 equity and to res t ruc ture the i r economies." Consesus could not be 
reached, however, and the study was rejected in favour of another that 
81 was to be submitted to tne Council six months later. 
Ul t imate ly , because agreement was not possible at the level 
of the Council o f Min is ters , the issue had to be referred to the heads 
of State at an extraordinary summit meeting of the PTA Authority in 
Bujumbura in May, 1986. As w i l l be seen, disagreement and lack of 
progress in several areas had become so serious that po l i t i ca l decisions 
were required to keep tne PTA moving forward. In fa c t , just prior to the 
t3ujumbura summit, Mauritius had issued a notice of intent to witndraw 
from the PTA a l t o g e t h e r , repor ted ly because the "organisation serves trie 
82 i n t e r e s t s of tne larger s ta tes in the region." 
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With regard to the ru les o f o r i g i n , the i s sue was resolved. 
in favour of a grace period and a s l id ing s c a l e of preferences . For a 
five-year period, those f i rms whose equity i s 51 percent l o ca l ly owned 
will receive 100 percent o f the PTA t a r i f f r e d u c t i o n s , as before. Firms 
with 41 to 50 percent 1. ca l ownership w i l l r e c e i v e 6o percent of these 
preferences; firms with 30 to 40 percent l o c a l ownership, 30 percent 
of the reductions. This move was v igorous ly opposed, however, by some 
of the smaller states. 
The major problem in the PTA's c l ear ing and settlement arrangement 
has been, and continues t o b e , the f a c t that payments f o r relatively 
few transactions have bee a channelled through the Clearing House. At 
f i r s t , this was because only a few s t a t e s had begun to use the f a c i l i t y , 
and there is s t i l l a lack o f knowledge among commercial banks and 
businessment about PTA procedures. The derogat ion o f the rules of 
origin in May, 1986, howevnr, contr ibuted t o an immediate increase in the 
value of trade handled through the c l ear ing f a c i l i t y . As indicated in 
Table 6 above, the value f o r June, 1987 , UAPTA 8 .9 m i l l i o n , was double 
the value for the pr ior month. The increase has s ince been sustained, 
as the figures show that the value o f a l l t ransact ions from May, 1986, 
through April, 1987 , UAPT'i 74.8 m i l l i o n , increased by 71.6 percent 
over the value for the pr Lor 12-month p e r i o d , UAPTA 43.6 million. 
Not a l l of the increase can be a t t r ibuted t o t rade , however. 
In an ef fort to bo lster che Clearing House even f u r t h e r , i t was also 
decided at the Bujumbura summit t h a t , rather than l i m i t the clearing 
fa c i l i t y to those t ransact ions e l i g i b l e f o r PTA pre f e rences , i t should 
83 be used to cover cny authorized t ransac t i ons between member states, 
84 
"including contributions and subscr ipt ions to PTA ins t i tut i ons . ' ' 
The Clearing House t h e r e f o r e opened accounts in August, 1986, to 
receive and disburse the c ont r ibut i ons o f the member s ta tes to the 
PTA Secretariat, the Clearing House i t s e l f , and the PTA Trade and 
Development Bank. Between August, 1986, and A p r i l , 1987 , contributions 
of UAPTA 5.5 million were c red i t ed to these accounts. This figure i s 
9.5 percent of total t ransact ions f o r t h i s p e r i o d , which means that 
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trade transact ions increased by 58.9 percent in the last 12 months: 
reported over the pr i o r 12-month period. 
There are s t i l l s t a t e s , however, that insist on invoicing their 
exports in U. S. d o l l a r s rather than in tneir own currencies, which 
precludes settlement through the Clearing House. Three states, Comoros, 
D j i b o u t i , and Somalia, have not yet begun to use the Clearing House 
at a l l . Rwanda and Tanzania have only recently begun to use i ts 
8 5 
f a c i l i t i e s , but not to the extent expected. Others, such as Uganda 
and Zambia, have suf fered from unstable currencies, so that, in 
addit ion t o the i r need f o r f ore ign exchange, they prefere to avoid 
invoiding t h e i r exports in the ir own currencies, which are declining in 
value. The value o f Malawi1 s currency has also been declining, but its 
pre ference f o r d o l l a r s i s a l so due to i ts need to pay in hard currency 
f o r goods imported from South Africa. 
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Nonetheless, there has been decided progress in the use of the 
PTA clearing fac i l i ty . A f ter the Bujumbura summit, the Secretary General 
6f the PTA announced that the proport ion o f in t ra - reg iona l trade 
handled by the Clearing Fouae anhac increased from f i / e percent in 1984 to 
65 percent in mid-1986. He ant i c ipa ted that by mid-19 87 the Clearing 
House would be handling £0 t o 90 percent o f a l l i n t r a - r o g i o n a l trade 
t r a n s a c t i o n s . ^ While chis o p t i m i s t i c p r e d i c t i o n has not been 
realized, i t exemplifies c l eg i t imate tendency to f o cus on how much progress 
has been made in only three years rather than on how far short that 
progress has been from the ultimate goal . The root causes o f the slow 
progress experienced by the Clearing House, however, remain: the weak 
economies of most of the member s ta tes and the major imbalances of 
industrial production within the subregion , problems that w i l l be 
exacerbated now that Kenya's PTA trade i s increas ing ly being channelled 
through the Clearing House. 
— Faci l i tat ion o f Trade 
Other factors t i a t have contributes! t o the PTA's slow start 
have been lack of information and slow implementation o f measures that 
fac i l i tate trade, not only at the intergovernmental l e v e l , but also in the 
private sector. In many c^.ses, f o r example, centra l and commercial banks 
have not established r e c i p r o c a l and correspondent accounts , respectively, 
with their counterparts in other member s t a t e s . One reason f o r the 
commercial bankers' d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to open correspondcr*: accounts — 
"that there was not adequate business t o warrant doing so" — was noted 
87 
at the June, 1987, Council meeting. Another may stem from the fact that 
the commercial banks l o s e a source o f earnings when payments are channelled 
through the PTA Clearing House, as PTA payments between commercial banks and 
their customers are in l o c a l currenc ies . This precludes the commercial 
banks' charging comrdssions on the f o r e i g n exchange that they purchase from 
central banks on behalf o f i n p o r t e r s , as they do in most non-PTA 
transactions. 
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Steps have been taken in the service sector to remedy some of 
the o b s t a c l e s t o t rade , however, and the situation is improving, albeit 
88 
rather s lowly . J Some commercial banks, for example, have instituted 
tra in ing programs f o r t h e i r personnel to prepare them to handle intra-
reg iona l trade matters. In addit ion, the PTA Federation of Chambers of 
Commerce undertook a survey o f banks that had opened correspondent 83 
accounts in order t o advise i t s member organizations. Nonetheless, 
disemination o f such information to businessmen has been exceedingly 
s low, and in ear ly 19 87 members o f the Kenya business community were s t i l l 
f ind ing i t d i f f i c u l t t o obtain banking advice and services for PTA 
t ransac t i ons . In Kenya, the m primary reason for this may be that the 
Central Bank i s deal ing only with the head o f f i ces of commerical banks <~n 
90 
PTA matters, and many banks have designated only one o f f i c e r to 
coordinate t h e i r PTA business . As a result , branch banks, particularly 
outs ide Nairob i , tend to be completelt unfamiliar with PTA operations. 
Exporters interviewed in Nairobi also complained about delays in payment, 
which should not occur when PTA arrangements are used. Many commercial 91 
bankers, however, have not yet f u l l y understood its. procedures. 
There seems to be a general tendency, among bankers as well as 
businessmen, to confuse the 75 day settlement period among states and 
t h e i r central banks with the prompt payment that should be provided to 
exporters by the commercial banks once a l l the necessary requirements have 
been met. 
Another obs t ac l e t o trade in the service sector has been the 
harmonization o f insurance throughtout the subregion. A PTA third party 
motor veh i c l e insurance scheme became operational only on July 1, 1987, 
92 
a f t e r nine s ta tes s igned the agreement. One of the factors that 
caused th is delay was the f a c t that the Northern Corridor states and the 
SADCC s ta tes each had the i r own subregional arrangements, and neither 93 group was i n c l i n e d to change t o the PTA formula. Nonetheless, a "yellow 
card , " to be completed and c e r t i f i e d by a national bureau, represented by 
94 
a designated insurance company in each state, has been devised and 
should be accepted in the coming months at most customs control points 
throughout the subregion. 
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It is l ike ly , however, that i t s acceptance w i l l be slow, as 
has been the case with the subregional Road Customs Transit 
Declaration (RCTD). Although t h i s document was adopted by the PTA 
95 
in July, 1985, only two s ta tes were using the RCTD by the end of 
October, 1986, and Rwanda was complaining that i t s haul iers were being 
required by transit countries to produce both the o ld and the new 
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documents. While such delays mya stem from re luctance on the part o f 
some monber states to implement PTA d e c i s i o n s , they are alsu due to the 
fact that routinization o f new procedures takes t ime, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the 
part of personnel who man customs posts where FTA t r a f f i c i s infrequent . 
Working out and implenentirg common agreements with regard to other 
service and transit -related issues w i l l t h e r e f o r e be a long-term process . 
These issues include common bonding arrangements, as we l l as common r u l e s , 
regulations, and standards f . r v e h i c l e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , ax l e loading and 97 t a r i f f s , road design, road t o l l s , and road t r a f f i c r egu la t i ons . 
Lack of information and experience amont* businessmen i s a l s o 
a major obstacle tc in t ra - reg iona l trade , and the Chambers o f 
Commerce and Indystry and other pro f ess i ona l organizat ions in the 
subregion — which not s u r r r i s i n g l y have been among the most enthusiast ic 
supporters of the PTA — have attenpted to address t h i s problan. 
National Chambers in some states began immeately t o hold seminars t o 
inform their members o f PTA regulat ions and advise thorn how t o p a r t i c i p a t e 
in the new trade arrangements. Other s t a t e s , however, have not developed wel l 
organized and active pro f ess i ona l business organizat ions . To help 
rect i fy this , the PTA Federation of Chambers o f Commerce and Industry was 
established in September, 198 5, t o " a s s i s t in the development and 
strengthening of a l l the nat ional Chambers", as we l l as t o " represent 
i ts members . . . at i l l re levant form with • the aim o f rpomoting t h e i r 
98 
business interests". The Federation i s a l s o designed to undertake a 
variety of act iv i t ies aimed at c o l l e c t i n g and disseminating information 
to its members, as experience with regard t o subregional markets and 
trading opportunities has been l imi ted in the past to a small number 
of mostly transnational corporat ions . High on the Federat ion ' s l i s t of 
prior it ies , therefore, are pub l i ca t i on o f trade d i r e c t o r i e s , trade 
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catalogues , handbooks, and trade and investment journals;" promotion of 
PTA Trade Fairs , which are designed to familiarize businessmen with the 
100 
goods and se rv i ces ava i lab le in the reg ion , and the organization of 
b u y e r / s e l l e r meetings based on demand and supply surveys currently .101 being conducted under the auspices o f the PTA Trade Information Network. 
By far the most success fu l trade-promotion enterprise to date 
has been the f i r s t PTA Trade Fair held in Nairobi in September/October, 
1986, at which " o v e r 1000 products from 800 companies of the subregion were 
102 
d isplayed, r e su l t ing in a po tent ia l business turnover of US $166,8 50,000". 
Trade f a i r s may well continue to be the best means of promoting sales until 
businesses f ind i t economically f e a s i b l e to invest in subregional 
adver t i s ing , sa les f o r c e s , and other means of marketing and distribution. 
From t h i s b r i e f d iscuss ion o f seme of the measures taken to 
f a c i l i t a t e trade in the subregion, i t becomes clear just how rudimentary 
were the i n t r a - r e g i o m l s e r v i c e f a c i l i t i e s and transport and communications 
networks that were inher i ted from the co l on ia l era. In soke areas, both 
the governments o f the member s tates and the private sector are almost 
starting fr«.m scratch. In o thers , they must cooperate to undo barriers to 
trade that were i n i t i a l l y ins t i tu ted to protect colonial revenues and 
infant indus t r i e s , and that have b etn perpetuated and complicated by the 
independent s ta tes f r o s imi lar reasons. This brings us to the final focus 
in t h i s s e c t i o n , the progress made toward reduction and eventual 
el imination o f in t ra - reg iona l t a r i f f s . 
Reduction o f T a r i f f s and the Common List 
As the PTA entered t i t s operational phase in July, 1984, i . e . , 
when the t a r i f f pre ference took e f f e c t , the Secretary General announced 
t a r i f f reduct ions on a Ccmmjn Lis t c f 212 categories of rr00(}s that 
qua l i f i ed f o r p r e f e r e n t i a l treatment within the rep-ion. Tariffs on these 
items, which f a l l into ten group.s ranginr from luxury goods to capital 
103 " 
goods, were reduced 10 t o 70 percent. (See Table 7 on the following page). 
The Treaty c a l l s f o r the L i s t to be amended and expanded periodically. 
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The most recent Common L i s t , incorporat ing a l l the changes a f t e r 
January, 1984, was published in September, 1986, and contains 325 
104 
items. The original in tent ion , as w i l l be discussed more f u l l y below, 
was to expand the List gradually so that a l l goods produced by PTA 
states would be include; by 1992,. while customs dut ies on the 
commodities already on the l i s t were to be reduced by 25 per cent every 105 two years and abolished completely by 1992. 
Table 7. PTA Common List 
Class i f i cat ion o f Goods and I n i t i a l T a r i f f Concessions 
Group C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
Group I Food (excludin - luxury items) 
Group II Raw Materials 
(a) Agricultural 
(b) Non-agricu-.tural 
Group III Intermediate Goods 
Group IV Manufactured consumer goods 
(excluding luxury items) 
(a) Durable consumer goods 
(excluding ( c ) and ( d ) below) 
(b) Non-durable consumer goods 
(excluding ( c ) and (J ) below) 
( c ) Highly competing consumer goods 
(d) Consumei goods o f par t i cu lar importance t o 
economic development 
Group V Capital goods ( inc lud ing transport equipment) 
Group VI Luxury goods 
Reduction (rc) 
30 
50 
60 
65 
40 
35 
30 
70 
70 
10 
Source: PTA Treat/, Annex 1, A r t i c l e 4 ) . 
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Behind this progress, however, l i e s a n o t h e r area of major 
disagreement. The issues o f which commodities t o place on the Common List 
and under what conditions were strongly contested by the less developed 
states from the start . They feared that, i f the L i s t were open to a l l prod\:C 
products that member states wished to 3 port , the ir own markets and infant 
industries would be swamped by goods produced in Kenya and Zimbabwe, while 
they would gain very l i t t l e in return, having fewer goods to o f f e r . 
Just as serious i s the fact that most states in the sub-region 
derive a substantial portion of their revenues, reportedly 30 percent in 
some cases , from customs d u t i e s . 1 0 6 Lesotho and Swaziland's depen ence 
on customs revenue i s even higher, as discussed above, although their trade 
with PTA states is t i l l rather limited. Kenya, which has reduced i t s 
dependence on this source o f revenue from 20 percent of gross receipts in 
107 
the recurrent account in 1981/82 to 13 percent in 1985/86, is m a much 
better posit ion than rrost other states in the subregion to absorb the 
revenue losses that wi l l result from lower t a r i f f s on PTA trade. Kenya 
i s also a net exporter to the subregion and w i l l therefore reap more 
bene f i t s thTO i t w i l l su f f er losses. There are states in the subregion, 
however, whose PTA imports are much higher in re lat ion to to ta l imports and 
for whom the PTA t a r i f f reductions w i l l have a much greater impact. 
Notwithstanding the fact that intra-regional trade i s a relat ively small 
share o f t o ta l trade throughout the subregion, there seems-to be a 
generalized fear that th ej l osses to government revenue entailed in PTA tar i f f 
reductions cannot be absorbed by states that are already faced with 
overwhelming debt burdens and shoitages in foreign exchange. 
In the seven conferences held before the Treaty was s igned, 1 0 8 
the negotiators fa i l ed to resolve the issues related to the Common List 
and t a r i f f reductions, even though the key wording specified that "the 
Common List shall include selected commodities which are of both export an^ 
109 ~—" 
import interest to the Member States ." .To further protect two of the 
least developed s ta tes , a provision was included that -ranted Comoros and 
Djibouti the right to reduce the ir customs duties by o n i y 25 percent o f the 
overal l PTA reductions f o r a period o f two years, a f ter which the matter was 
to be renegotiated at two-year i n t e r v a l s . 1 1 0 Even so , t h e r e were last-minute 
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changes in the f ina l version of the Treaty, which included the 
e l i m i n a t i o n of wording that provided most favoured nation treatment for 
commodities that do not appear on the Common List. The treaty as signed 
a c c o r d s th is treatment only t c items contained in the L i s t . 1 1 1 
Although they signed the Treaty, some o f the states that had 
m o s t vigprously contested these issues took refuge in non-implementation 
o f the technical measures "tha.1i are required "to in i t ia te active 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . By the em: o f the PTA's second year, f i v e states - -
Comoros, Djibouti , Ethiopia, Mauritius, and Somalia — had not published 
t h e l ega l notices that arc necessary to enable customs o f f i c i a l s t o 
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handle goods e l i g ib l e for re ferent ia l treatment. Tanzania adopted a 
d i f f e r e n t tac t i c and simply refused to si^n the Treaty until additional 
a g r i c u l t u r a l and mineral pre ducts of particular interest, to Tanzania 1 1 q (Gr-oup l i b ) were added to the Common List in 1985. 
The Treaty provides that the Common List " shal l be amended from 
t i m e t o time by the Council on the recommendation of the (Customs and 
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Trade ) Cof mittee." The process of adding new items to the List has 
b e e n , however, one of the irost serious sticking points to further progress 
Kenya and Zimbabwe continued to oppose the requirement that an item must 
have (3 port interest from at least one country and import interest from 
another be fore i t can be added. But in July, 19 85, Ethiopia and Tanzania 
r e s e r v e d their positions on a proposed amendment to the Treaty which 
a l l owed the addition o f commodities that are of either, rather than both, 
a p o r t and import interest to the member s ta tes . 1 1 5 Although the amendment 
was passed, some o f the less developed states reportedly continued to 
appiroach the issue as i f such commodities must not duplicate goods 
manufactured in the importing s t a t e . T o se t t l e the question, the Heads 
of S t a t e agreed in Bujumbura in May, 1986, that the "export and import 117 
i n t e r e s t " requirement would be retained for f ive years. This was a 
c l e a r v i c t o ry for the less developed states, which helped to o f f s e t their 
l o s s at the same meeting on the ru les -o f -or ig in issue. In return for 
a l l o w i n g participation o f foreign-owned firms in the PTA for f ive years, th 
l e s s developed states were to receive some protection of their infant 
i n d u s t r i e s for the same period o f time. 
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This was not the end o f the matter, however, The argument 
prevai led that the o r i g i n a l wording in the Treaty was restrictive and 
negated other o f i t s o b j e c t i v e s , namely, the achievement of a common 
market and a zero intra-FTA t a r i f f by 1992. This presumes that a l l items 
I 1 8 
traded within the subregion would be on the List before that date. 
I t was there fore agreed at the June, 19 87, Council meeting that 
commodities f o r which trade was already taking place among the 
member states should be submitted for inclusion in the Commjjg 
L i s t s ince there was already an import and 3 port interest. 
The automatic inc lus ion o f commodities already being traded means 
that the L i s t w i l l expand much more rapidly and that future reductions' 
in t a r i f f s w i l l have a much greater impact on the customs revenues o f the 
member s tates . For th i s reason, three studies have been undertaken in an 
e f f o r t t o f i x an acceptable t ime- tab le f o r the elimination of intra-
reg iona l customs dut ies . In December, 1984, the'Council of Ministers 
approved a formula s p e c i f y i n g that t a r i f f s on commodities on the Common 
Lis t were t o t o reduced by 25 percent every two years, beginning October 1, 
1986, so that a zero t a r i f f could be reached by 1992. By December, 1985, 
however, some o f the s ta tes had already begun to question whether this would 
f e a s i b l e , and the Council c a l l e d f o r a second study. While that study was 
in progress , the o r i f i n . i l date f o r the f i r s t 25 percent further reduction carr 
and went. By that time, f i v e o f the member states had not published' the 
bas i c reduct ions ( as in Table 7 above) , and Ethiopia was arguing for a 
delay. When the second study was presented to the Intergovernmental 
Commission o f Experts ( ICE) , Ethiopia ins isted that the study was flawed 
f o r a var iety f o f reasons, but i t was nonetheless approved by the 
Council o f Ministers . The Heads o f S t a t e , however, in the interest of 
moving forward in un i ty , overturned the Council 's recommendation in 
i on 
December, 1986, and c a l l e d f o r a t h i r d study. 
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The third f e a s i b i l i t y study attempted, inter a l i a , 
to undertake an ana lys i s o f the impact o f the PTA trade 
l iberal ization process on the economies o f the member 
states, with p a r t i c u l a r re ference t o revenue collejtj j -on, 
halance of payments and o v e r a l l eccnomic a c t i v i t y . 
In addition to the negative aspects o f revenue l o s s , the study 
attempted to take into cons iderat ion the b e n e f i t s that would accrue from 
increased subregional trade, as wel l as 
tc formulate s p e c i a l and d i f f e r e n t i a l arrangements where 
necessary, bearing in mind the agreement to undertake a 
study on measures f o r c o r r e c t i n g , in the medium and long term 
development d i s p a r i t i e s exist isms f o r ensuring equitable 
distribution o f cos ts and b e n e f i t s arising, f r a n ^ t p 
implementation o f the prov i s i ons o f the Treaty. 
The Study Team attempted to p r o j e c t the l o s s e s o f t o ta l 
government revenue that would resu l t from l i b e r a l i z a t i o n o f intra -
regional trade. Reproduced in Table 8 on the f o l l owing page are selected 
figures from the study. The percentages f o r 1985, ind i ca t ing PTA 
customs revenues as a percentage o f t o t a l government revenue, are based on 
actual intra-regional trade and there fo re encompass a l l commodities traded, 
whether they appear on the 'lommon L i s t or not. The f igures f o r 1986, 
showing losses in revenue as a . percentage o f t o t a l government revenue, 
incorporate the originally-planned 25 percent reduct ion , but as also 
re f lec t the comparatively l imited number o f items currently on the Common 
List. The figures for 199 2 represent FTA-related revenue l o s s e s as a 
percentage of total government revenue, assuming that PTA t a r i f f s were 
eliminated completely by that date and that the Common Lis t were t o be 
expanded to cover a l l commodities traded within the subregion. The losses 
indicated for 1986 and 1992 ; are overs tated , however, because there would als 
be gains from the l i bera l i za t i on o f t rade in terms o f addit ional 
employment, increased taxes on incomes, p r o f i t s , and s a l e s , and overal l 
economic expansion. These gains would vary by country and would be quite 
marginal in some of the less developed s ta tes . 
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Table 8. PTA Customs Revenue as a % o f Total Government Revenue and It. 
Loss as a % o f Total Government Revenue Selected Years 
(see t e x t f o r explanation) 
Country As % o f Total Loss as % of Total 
Government Revenue Government Revenue 
19 85 1986 1992 
Burundi 1. 60 . 56 3.30 
Comoros 2.90 1. 82 7.93 
Dj ibout i 11. 20 2.60 9.84 
Ethiopia . 50 .10 .90 
Kenya . 80 .20 .45 
Lesotho .001 .10 .38 
Malawi 1. 50 - 4 0 2.20 
Mauritius 1.00 .25 1.23 
Rwanda 6. 30 1.48 3.97 
Somalia 4.10 .80 4. 70 
Swaziland .04 .05 .69 
Tanzania . 30 .10 i 60 
Uganda 3. 30 8.40 .10 
Zamh ia .90 . 20 . 80 
Zimbabwe . 40 .08 .45 
Source: PTA Study on the F e a s i b i l i t y o f Eliminating Customs Duties ,• "April 1987, 
Tables I I I and IVa. 
The f i gures pro jec ted f o r 1992 indicate that eight of the PTA 
states would have l o s t l e s s than one percent of total government revenue in 
that year i f the o r i g i n a l 25 percent reduction had been instituted as 
scheduled. ( Included in t h i s group, interestingly enough, i s Ethiopia). 
The impact on Mauritius would not have been significant either, as its loss 
would have been jus t over one percent . Even with increasing international 
debt burdens, these s ta t es could have absorbed the projected losses. 
Despite the f a c t that Malawi and Burundi would have lost 2.2 and 3.3 
percent, r e s p e c t i v e l y , o f the i r t o t a l government revenue, these states 
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1 2 3 indicated their support f b r meeting the 1992 target date. This 
leaves four countries whose government revenues would have been significantly 
affected by intra-PTA trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n : Comoros, D j i b o u t i , Rwanda, 
and Somalia. Of these, Comoros and Dj ibout i were granted by the 
Treaty the right to red j ce t h e i r custons duties in the f i r s t two 
years by only 25 percent o f the PTA reduct i ons , with subsequent 
reductions to be renegoriated. Nonetheless, these four s tates are 
obvious candidates for compensation. 
In i t s conclusions the study steam noted that ; 
even though the study revealed that r e l a t i v e shares of 
revenue cuts are ac tua l ly small compared to t o t a l 
government revenues . . . , th i s f ear i s s t i l l a r e a l i t y and 
a key factor in approaching the i ssue o f trade 
l iberalization in the subregion, p a r t i c u l a r l y when 
some member countries are keen to be e x c l u s i v e l y 
captured as markets f o r others . 
It therefore concluded tha" the 199 2 z e r o - t a r i f f op t i on was feasible 
only i f some type of comensatory mechanism were i n s t i t u t e d , and 
suggested several a l ternative arrangements. Because the compensatory 
fund that i t found preferable could not be implemented in a relat ively 
short time, however, the j rudy team recommended that PTA t a r i f f s be 
reduced by 20 percent every two years , beginning in 1988, t o reach a 
125 zero intra-regional tar i f . : in 1996. 
When this study was presented t o the PTA Technical Committee 
on Trade and Customs in April /May, 1987, a l l member s ta tes except 
Ethiopia and Somalia endorsed th is recommendation. Ethiopia insisted 
on yet another study on the grounds that the s e l e c t i o n o f competent 
consultants had been flawed, and Somalia supported the c a l l f o r a 
further study. The. technical Committee was o f the view, however, that 
the points raised by Ethiopia were not c o r r e c t and there fore referred 
the matter to the higher p o l i c y organs f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 1 2 6 
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At the Council meeting in June, 1987, a representative of 
UNCTAD, which had provided one o f the consultants on the study team,' 
pointed out tha t , 
given the r o l e o f economic integration and trade 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n as indispensable strategies for sub-regional 
economic recovery and growth, i t was essential that the 
momentum should be maintained -and that progress should not 
be determined by the a b i l i t y of the i ^ k e s t member States 
to move in unison with the strongest. 
Nonetheless, the l e s s developed states required assistance " to 
cope with the adverse impact o f t h e i r participation in the PTA trade 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n arrar 
out l ined , inc luding 
1 2 8 ngements." " Various compensatory mechanisms were 
derogat ions such as allowing some members to l iberalise 
at a slower pace than other member states; 
arrangements to r e l i e v o Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
from commitments that can be seen to have serious adverse 
e f f e c t s r.n t h e i r budgets; 
preference t o LDCs with respect to the application of the 
Rules o f Origin; 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f c e r t a i n products from LDCs for duty free 
admission into the markets of the more developed member 
s ta tes on a n o n - r e c i p t o c a l basis; and 
preference t o LDCs in the location of industrial enterprises 
129 and ether i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Fiscal compensation, however, was not recommended because i t involved 
"inherent complexit ies and had not worked satisfactori ly in other economic 
integrat ion groupings". 
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The UNCTAD representat ive s t ressed t h a t , whatever compensatory 
mechanisms were chosen, they should be implemented simultaneously with the 
f i r s t ta r i f f reductions in 19 88. His report end recommendations were 
supported by the representatives o f the Council o f Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON) and o f the Economic Community for Latin 
America (ECLA). 
In the extensive d i s cuss ions that f o l l owed , d i f f e r i n g views 
were put forward concerning simultaneous implementation o f compensatory 
mechanisms and further t a r - f f reduct ions . The Council noted that at the 
r 
prior ICE meeting, the majority o f the delegates had agreed that 
corrective measures and derogations should be incorporated 
in the trade l i b e r a l i s a t i o n process but . . . should not be a 
precondition . . " ut . . . consequential t o the e f f e c t s of the 
trade l i bera l i sa t i on process . They fur ther pointed out that 
i t would be f d i f f i c u l t t o i n s t i t u t e compensation, 
derogation or c o r r e c t i v e measures b e f o r e the "t^gg and extent 
of damage or c o s t a r i s i n g therefrom was known. 
Delegates frcm some o f the l e s s developed s ta tes had argued at the ICE 
meeting, however, that " i t was necessary to put in p lace corrective 
measures and derogation be fo re the implementation o f the f i r s t further 
t a r i f f reduction in 19 88.1 , 1 31 
Ultimately, the Council agreed to d i l u t e the tar i f f - reduct ion 
process and postpone and z e r o - t a r i f f ta rge t data t o the year 2000. 
Therefore, e f fect ive October, 19 88, member s ta tes w i l l further reduce 
intra-PTA tar i f f s by 10 percent every two years through October, 1996, for a 
total reduction of 50 percent ; and then i n s t i t u t e a further 20 percent 
reduction in 1998 ant. a fur ther 30 percent reduct ion in October, 2000. 
In the meantime, a study o f "mechanisms required t o ensure equitable 
distribution of cost 5 and b e n e f i t s " w i l l be expedited and presented 
not later than the end o f 19 88; and the s i t u a t i o n w i l l be reviewed in 
1996. 
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These d e c i s i o n s were not unanimous. Comoros and Djibouti 
reserved t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , ' Comoros because of th'e simultaneity issue, 
Djibouti because i t " cou ld not accept the t a r i f f reduction programme 
132 
before the r e s u l t s o f the study were known". 
Evaluation o f Progress and Problems in the PTA 
In summarizing the t r a d e - r e l a t e d operations of the PTA to date, 
one can point to c l e a r progress in a number of areas. Trade transactions 
handled trhough the PTA Clearing House have increased by 70 percent in the 
last year iver the pr i o r 12 month per i od , and the net settlements in 
hard currency have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced. In the last six months 
for which f igures are a v a i l a b l e , an average of .62 percent of al l 
transactions were s e t t l e d in l o c a l currencies , which produced a savings in 
foreign exchange fDr the member s t a t e s . In addition, valuable 
experience has been gained as business firms have begun to trade through 
the Clearing House; and the s e r v i c e s e c t o r has begun to organize i t s e l f 
for subregional trade. A highly s u c c e s s f u l PTA Trade Fair has been 
held; a second Fair i s in the planning stage; and an information network 
with regard t o trade opportuni t ies in the subregion is being established. 
As a r e s u l t , i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade as a proportion of total trade has 
increased from 4 percent in 1973-1900 t o 6.5 percent in the 1980-1985 
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period. As shown in Table 9 on the following page, the sharp 
decline in intra-PTA trade that occurred in the early 1980s slowed 
s igni f i cant ly in 1984, the year that the PTA became operational, and an 
increase o f 4.9 percent in i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade was recorded in 1986. 
Further increases can be expected as promotion of subregional trade 
continues and more experience i s gained. 
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Intra-PTA Exports and Imports 19 80-1986 (Excluding Lesotho and 
Swaziland) ( i n mi l l i ons o f U.S. Do l lars ) 
Table 9. 
Exports 
Imports 
Total 
% Change 
1990 
572.30 
558.49 
1130. 79 
1983 
504 . 79 
517.07 
1 0 2 1 . 0 6 
-9 .6 
1982 
412.64 
525.10 
9 37. 78 
-8. 2 
1963 
384.87 
445.93 
030. 00 
- 1 1 . 4 
1984 
370.38 
433.97 
812.35 
- 2 . 2 
1985 
367. 37 
432. 25 
799.62 
11.6 
1986 
385.91 
452.58 
838.49 
4.9 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade S t a t i s t i c s Yearbook 1987' 
Further, the PTA summit meeting in Bujumbura in May, 1986, 
provided evidence that the p o l i t i c a l w i l l s t i l l e x i s t s among the region's 
leaders to compromise on highly contentious issues in order to keep 
the PTA functioning. The derogation o f the rules o f o r i g i n , however, 
and the slowing of the time-cable f o r t a r i f f reduct ions r e f l e c t serious 
conf l i c t s and major underlying problems. In f a c t , the la t te r c a l l s into 
question whether a common market can be achieved by the new target date, 
i f i t can be achieved at a l l , as Ethiopia has suggested the year 2005 as 
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a more appropriate date and Somalia the year 2014. Meanwhile, the PTA is 
already beginning to s l ip behind the schedule envisioned in the Lagos 
Pla of Action. 
Perhaps the best way t o assess the progress o f the PTA i s to put 
i t in comparative perspective. Organizat ional ly , i t f a l l s between SADCC 
and ECOWAS. The former has de l ibera te ly avoided e s t a b l i s h i n g a t reaty 
and creating an expensive bureaucracy in favor o f c l o s e and frequent ad hoc 
i35 
meetings among i t s Heads of S tate , whereas ECOWAS adopted an elaborate 
and, in some key areas, rather vague t reaty and spent the next f our years 
building i ts subregional ins t i tu t i ons and r e f i n i n g i t s procedures before. 
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beginning i t s trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n program. " The PTA states have created 
a small Secre tar ia t comprised o f a handful o f professionals and short-
137 
term consultants . ' They have chosen t o proceed immediately toward 
the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n o f in terna l t rade , which has the advantage of " 
avoiding the tedium experienced in ECOWAS in i t s f i r s t years,' but which 
ra> serve t o halt the process J ntegrat ion more rapidly. 
The PTA approach t o i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade , like that of ECOWAS, is 
to progress ive ly reduce internal t a r i f f s t o zero before instituting a 
common external t a r i f f , but , unlike ECOWAS, be fore measures for positive 
integrat ion begin to have an e f f e c t . Progressively reducing internal 
t a r i f f s g ives f r e e r re in t o market f o r c e s and competition, which 
experience in many economic communities has shown leads to a further 
p o l a r i z a t i o n o f growth within the sxtbregion, as the more"'developed states 
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are the main b e n e f i c i a r i e s . To counteract th i s negative outcome, most 
attempts at economic in tegra t i on in the l a s t two decades have included measures 
both t o overcome the l o c a t i o n a l e f f e c t s with regard to new industries and 
to compensate the l e s s developed states in the subregion for revenue . 
l o sses sustained in reor ient ing t h e i r trade toward their more advanced 
partners. 
The FTA Treaty contains two important mechanisms to address 
these problems. The f i r s t i s a p rov i s i on f o r "co-operation in the f ie ld 
13 o f ' i n d u s t r i a l development" t o promote "complementary industrial development." 
Studies have t h e r e f o r e been undertaken to f ind suitable sites in the sub-
region f o r heavy bas i c industr ies such as s t e e l -milling and f e r t i l i z e r 
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product ion, but such a program is a long-term undertaking that will 
not produce even p o t e n t i a l gains f o r the less developed states before 
they begin to s u f f e r l o s ses in the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of trade. There i s , 
however, an i n t e r e s t i n g prov i s i on in the Treaty f o r the establishment of 
"mult inat ional i n d u s t r i a l enterpr i ses " within the subregion, i . e . , jo int 
ventures "whol ly owned e i t h e r by two o r more member states or by nationals 141 
of two or more Member S t a t e s . " This ' s an opportunity for the more 
developed s ta tes t o p a r t i c i p a t e more quickly in new enterprises in the less 
developed s t a t e s , but i t po ints up the f a c t that there is as yet no 
subregional i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n strategy . 
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The second prov i s i on in the Treaty o f a compensatory nature i s the 
FTA Trade and Development Bank, which has been establ i shed in Bujumbura and 
was scheduled to become f u l l y operat ional i n July , 1 9 0 7 . 1 4 2 One o f i t s 
objectives, according to the Treaty, i s t o " f u r t h e r the aims o f the 
Preferential Trade Area bj/ f inanc ing , wherever p o s s i b l e , p r o j e c t s 
designed to make the economies o f the Member States increas ing ly 
143 
complementary to each other'.' Referring to the l e s s developed s t a t e s , the 
Secretary General o f the ITA has sa id that investment p o l i c i e s would be 
"weighed in their favour" , and that the PTA Bank would be used f o r t h i s 
purpose. Again, however,, the l e s s developed s t a t e s w i l l not b e n e f i t 
from Bank-financed p r o j e c t s in the immediate f u t u r e , although i t should 
be noted that the cho ice o f 3urundi as the s i t e f o r the PTA Bank in i t s e l f 
represents a step toward spreading regional b e n e f i t s t o the l e s s developed 
states. 
In the meantime, th i PTA seems t o have dismissed the c rea t i on of 
a redistributional mechanism or a compensatory fund, such as the Protocal 
on Compensation for Revenue Loss annexed t o the ECOWAS Treaty or i t s Fund 
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for Co-operation, Compensation and Development. Even with these 
measures, there was evidence within a year a f t e r trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n was 
begun in ECOWAS that the l e s s developed states o f that community were 146 
beginning to res is t implementation o f the program. The PTA economic 
integration process could grind t o a halt f o r the same reasons. 
The question there fore remains opSri as t o how f a r and how f a s t 
the more advanced s tates o f the PTA can push t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s b e f o r e the 
less developed states turn from foot -dragg ing t o withdrawal. Already, 
Kenya and Zimbabwe's ins i s tence that the rules o f o r i g i n • . be re laxed 
to accommodate foreign-owned f i rms, and t h e i r s u c c e s s f u l push t o expand •' 
the Common List , have met with non-implementation o f PTA prov is ions in some 
states, a delay in the t a r i f f - r e d u c t i o n process at the ins i s tence o f two 
states, and a threat o f outr ight withdrawal from another. Given Kenya's 
increase in manufacturing production in 1906 and the current d e c l i n e in 
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Zimbabwe's output, Kenya i s in a p o s i t i o n t o so dominate i n t r a -
regional trade in the ne: t severa l years that the worst fears o f the 
smaller states could be confirmed. The only d i r e c t means o f redress ing 
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Kenya's large imbalance in trade i s f c r Kenya to increase i t s imports from 
the PTA s tates . There i s evidence that th i s has occurred, but Kenya's 
exports to the sub-region are s t i l l s i x times the value of i ts imports. 
In the meantime, ways must be found t c provide compensation or "side 
payments" t c the l e ss developed s ta tes b e f o r e the integration process 
stagnates. Unless the more advanced s ta tes work for the benefit of those 
that are l e s s developed, they w i l l j eopardize the health of the regional 
organization. 
. s 
Ultimately, o f course , the more advanced states and the less 
developed s ta tes a l ike must approach the PTA, in the words of the team that 
conducted the study on t a r i f f s , as 
the means f o r recovery and not something to be achieved 
a f t e r recovery in each country . . . . Costs of econdmic 
in tegrat i on and c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - r e l i a n c e should be 
viewed l i k e any other development c o s t , as inves tine nets 
which w i l l y i e l d p o s i t i v e and l a s t ing^gs u l t s , even though 
t h e i r ges tat ion period might be long. 
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